VulnerabilityPublished 2 Aug 2026Updated 31 Aug 2026

CVE-2026-10774: zephyrproject zephyr · Dos

Affects zephyrproject zephyrSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 2.4 Low : upgrade to 4.4.2 or 4.3.1 when convenient.

Data as of 1 Nov 2026, 08:20 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

2.4Low

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 21% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 4.4.2, 4.3.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Attack Vector: Adjacent
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: High
User Interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: None
Integrity: None
Availability: Low

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Adjacent: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack, but the attack is limited at the protocol level to a logically adjacent topology. This can mean an attack must be launched from the same shared physical (e.g., Bluetooth or IEEE 802.11) or logical (e.g., local IP subnet) network, or from within a secure or otherwise limited administrative domain (e.g., MPLS, secure VPN to an administrative network zone).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: High: The attacker is authorized with (i.e., requires) privileges that provide significant (e.g., administrative) control over the vulnerable component that could affect component-wide settings and files.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: None: There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.
Integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.
Availability: Low: Performance is reduced or there are interruptions in resource availability. Even if repeated exploitation of the vulnerability is possible, the attacker does not have the ability to completely deny service to legitimate users. The resources in the impacted component are either partially available all of the time, or fully available only some of the time, but overall there is no direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 2 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 31 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade zephyrproject zephyr to 4.4.2 or 4.3.1.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
zephyrprojectzephyr	Affected >=4.4.0 <4.4.2	Fixed in 4.4.2
zephyrprojectzephyr	Affected >=3.6.0 <4.3.1	Fixed in 4.3.1
GitHubzephyr`pkg:github/zephyr`Other threats	Affected >=3.6.0 <4.3.1 >=4.4.0 <4.4.2	Fixed in 4.3.1 4.4.2

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

The described fix aligns the key destruction guard with the import guard to properly free PSA key slots. If you cannot patch yet, affected devices may require reboot to recover from key slot exhaustion. No generic mitigations are specified.

Description

Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh subnet key management leaks one PSA Crypto key slot on every subnet-key teardown. In subsys/bluetooth/mesh/subnet.c, net_keys_create() imports the Private Beacon Key into a PSA key slot under CONFIG_BT_MESH_PRIV_BEACONS (enabled by default), but subnet_keys_destroy() guarded the matching psa_destroy_key() with CONFIG_BT_MESH_V1d1. That Kconfig symbol was removed when explicit Mesh 1.0.1 support was dropped, so the destroy branch became permanently dead code and the import is never balanced by a destroy. The imbalanced teardown is reached every time subnet keys are destroyed: deleting a subnet (Config Server NetKey Delete), completing a Key Refresh Procedure (which retires the old key set), and resetting/re-provisioning the node. The over-the-air triggers are processed only under the node's device key, so they are exercisable by the provisioner or network administrator that owns the node, reachable over the Bluetooth Mesh network. With the default CONFIG_MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT of 16, repeated add/delete or key-refresh cycles exhaust the shared PSA key-slot pool after roughly a dozen rounds. Once exhausted, bt_mesh_private_beacon_key() and thus subnet creation fail: the node can no longer add subnets or complete key refresh, and other PSA crypto consumers on the device may be starved, until the device is rebooted. The fix aligns the destroy guard with the import guard (CONFIG_BT_MESH_PRIV_BEACONS) so each slot is freed.

Impact

The vulnerability causes a denial of service by exhausting PSA Crypto key slots on the device, which prevents the node from adding new subnets or completing key refresh procedures. This can also affect other PSA crypto consumers on the device. The impact is limited to availability and requires high privileges (provisioner or network administrator) to trigger. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact.

Summary

Zephyr's Bluetooth Mesh subsystem leaks one PSA Crypto key slot each time a subnet key is torn down because the code importing the Private Beacon Key into a PSA key slot is enabled by default (CONFIG_BT_MESH_PRIV_BEACONS), but the corresponding key destruction code is conditionally compiled under a removed configuration (CONFIG_BT_MESH_V1d1). As a result, the key slots are never freed. This imbalance occurs during subnet deletion, key refresh completion, or node reset/re-provisioning, all of which can be triggered over-the-air by authorized provisioners or network administrators. With the default PSA key slot count of 16, about a dozen such cycles exhaust the key slots, causing failures in subnet creation and key refresh operations and potentially starving other PSA crypto consumers until reboot. The fix involves aligning the destroy guard with the import guard to ensure proper freeing of key slots.

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Exploitation evidence

What to do

Affected software

Description

AI analysisMachine-generated, updated 10 Aug 2026, 15:17 UTC

Technical details

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