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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-115683: GNOME Epiphany · Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

Affects GNOME EpiphanySource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.8 Medium.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 14:33 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
6.8Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (fedora)CVSS 3.16.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 30 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
EpiphanyepiphanyAffected
  • All versions
Fixed in–
GitHubgnome/epiphanypkg:github/gnome/epiphanyOther threatsAffected
  • All versions
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

No fixed release is currently available. Users should avoid following links from untrusted sites to HTTPS destinations and not rely on Epiphany for sensitive browsing when dealing with untrusted content. Restricting network access for untrusted browsing is recommended. Restarting the browser clears any attacker-installed certificate exceptions for the session. Users should update to fixed packages once they become available.

Description

A race condition in Epiphany allows a malicious website to bypass the TLS/SSL certificate warning page. Epiphany registers the main-world script message handler "tlsErrorPage" so its internal TLS error page can implement "Accept Risk and Proceed". The handler was registered immediately before loading the error page, leaving a brief window where the previously loaded untrusted origin could still call window.webkit.messageHandlers.tlsErrorPage.postMessage(...). The only authorization check compares a numeric WebKit page id that increments predictably; an attacker can burst-guess ids and approve a certificate exception with no user click. If a victim visits malicious site A that redirects to site B with an invalid certificate, site A can, for a few milliseconds, disable TLS certificate error warnings for host B until Epiphany is restarted, enabling man-in-the-middle or site spoofing for that host. Upstream report: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/work_items/2978 Proof of concept: https://beford.net/poc/ssl_poc.html Fix: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/epiphany/-/merge_requests/2245 (register handlers on LOAD_COMMITTED). No fixed release tagged yet; reporter and maintainer describe all current versions as affected. Maintainer notes the risky registration timing dates to commit 1da1caed (Epiphany 45.x era); before that the handlers were always registered and similarly reachable from web content.

References

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