CVE-2026-12045: pgAdmin 4 · SQL Injection
Affects pgAdmin 4Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.0 Critical : upgrade to 9.16 as a priority.
Data as of 1 Nov 2026, 22:58 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 51% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 9.16
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 18 Jun 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 1 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade pgAdmin 4 to 9.16.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pgadmin.orgpgAdmin 4 | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubpgAdmin 4pkg:github/pgAdmin 4Other threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
The described fix involves validating the LLM-supplied SQL query to ensure it is a single, safe statement before execution. Until an official patch or update is applied, restrict write access to database objects that the AI Assistant may inspect and limit the privileges of the pgAdmin user role to minimize risk.
Description
Read-only transaction bypass in the pgAdmin 4 AI Assistant allows an attacker who can influence database content that the assistant reads to execute arbitrary SQL with the privileges of the pgAdmin user's database role. The AI Assistant's execute_sql_query tool runs LLM-generated SQL inside a BEGIN TRANSACTION READ ONLY wrapper to prevent data modification. The LLM-supplied query was forwarded to the database driver without restriction to a single statement or to read-only verbs, so a multi-statement payload beginning with COMMIT, END, ROLLBACK, or ABORT terminated the read-only transaction and ran subsequent statements in autocommit mode. The trailing ROLLBACK then had no effect. Delivery is via prompt injection: an attacker who can write content into any object the AI Assistant may inspect (a row, a column value, a comment) can cause the LLM to emit the multi-statement payload as a tool call. With ordinary write privileges on the pgAdmin user's role the attacker can perform unauthorised data modification. When the pgAdmin user's role is a PostgreSQL superuser or holds pg_execute_server_program, the chain extends to remote code execution on the database server host via COPY ... TO PROGRAM. Fix validates the LLM-supplied query up front: it must parse to exactly one non-empty / non-comment statement whose leading real token (after stripping whitespace, comments, and punctuation) is one of SELECT, WITH, EXPLAIN, SHOW, VALUES, or TABLE. Transaction-control verbs, DML, DDL, CALL, COPY, DO, SET/RESET, and everything else are rejected before any database work happens. PostgreSQL's READ ONLY mode continues to backstop data-modifying CTEs, EXPLAIN ANALYZE on writes, and volatile side effects. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 9.13 before 9.16.