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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-12681: Google go-attestation · Improper validation of specified index, position, or offset in input

Affects Google go-attestationSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.9 High : upgrade to 0.6.1 soon.

Data as of 6 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
8.9High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 19% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.6.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 24 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 6 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade github.com/google/go-attestation to 0.6.1.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Googlego-attestationAffected
  • <=0.6.0
Fixed in–
Gogithub.com/google/go-attestationpkg:golang/github.com/google/go-attestationOther threatsAffected
  • <0.6.1
Fixed in
  • 0.6.1

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

The affected versions are all go-attestation releases prior to 0.6.1. Users should upgrade to version 0.6.1 or later once available.

Description

## Summary `parseEfiSignatureList()` in `attest/internal/events.go` does not skip `SignatureHeaderSize` vendor bytes before reading `EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST` signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1. ## Impact For `hashSHA256SigGUID` lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate — breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation. ## Root Cause After `binary.Read(&signatures.Header)` reads 28 bytes, `buf` points to the start of the `SignatureHeaderSize` vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at `sigOffset := 0` instead of `sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize`, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries. ## Affected versions All versions through commit `f877374` (2026-05-15). ## Fix Pull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502 - Add bound check: `SignatureHeaderSize` must not exceed remaining list space - Skip `SignatureHeaderSize` bytes before both entry loops - Regression test: `TestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSize`

References

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