CVE-2026-12905: Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System (WordPress plugin) · Insecure Direct Object Reference
Affects Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.3 Medium.
Data as of 14 Nov 2026, 20:44 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 33% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 16 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 14 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ladelaOnline Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – Bookly | Affected
| Fixed in– |
AI-suggested
Until an official fix is available, restrict staff-level access to trusted users only and monitor for suspicious enumeration of appointment IDs. Avoid exposing access_key tokens broadly. Follow vendor updates for a security patch addressing this authorization bypass.
Description
The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 27.7 via the appointment() method of the Mobile Staff Cabinet API (resource=appointment, action=bookly_mobile_staff_cabinet) in frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php. This is due to the handler loading an Appointment by the attacker-supplied params[id] without verifying that the appointment's staff_id matches the authenticated staff member, whereas sibling operations (deleteAppointment, saveAppointment, appointments list) correctly scope to $this->staff->getId() when $this->role === ROLE_STAFF. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with staff-level mobile cabinet access (any valid access_key token bound to a Staff entity), to read appointment details — including the internal note and the full customer_appointments collection (customer full_name, email, phone, notes, custom_fields, extras, payment_total, payment_type, payment_status) — belonging to other staff members by enumerating sequential appointment IDs.
References
- wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1600466e-ad45-4dc7-916b-6c97301d2b03?source=cve (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/27.7/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/27.7/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/Ajax.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/27.7/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/24.9/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler1_0.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/24.9/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/Ajax.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool/tags/24.9/frontend/modules/mobile_staff_cabinet/api/handlers/Handler.php (opens in a new tab)
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=&old=3637918%40bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool&new=3637918%40bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool (opens in a new tab)