CVE-2026-13758: MIK CryptX · Timing Side Channel
Affects MIK CryptXSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.7 Low : upgrade to 0.088_001 when convenient.
Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 34% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.088_001
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 29 Jun 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade MIK CryptX to 0.088_001.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| MIKCryptX | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubCryptXpkg:github/CryptXOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Users should avoid using the streaming decrypt_done($tag) function for AEAD tag verification in CryptX versions before 0.088_001. Instead, use the one-shot *_decrypt_verify helpers which perform constant-time tag verification.
Description
CryptX versions before 0.088_001 for Perl compare AEAD authentication tags in non-constant time in the streaming decrypt_done path. The decrypt_done($tag) form compares it against the computed tag with memNE (memcmp() != 0), which short-circuits on the first differing byte, so its run time depends on the number of matching leading bytes. This affects all five AEAD modes: GCM, CCM, ChaCha20Poly1305, EAX and OCB. The one-shot *_decrypt_verify helpers are unaffected; they verify the tag inside libtomcrypt with a constant-time comparison. The timing difference is a tag-verification oracle. An attacker who can submit many candidate tags for the same nonce, ciphertext and associated data while measuring the timing precisely enough may recover the expected tag byte by byte and forge a message that verifies.