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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-13758: MIK CryptX · Timing Side Channel

Affects MIK CryptXSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 3.7 Low : upgrade to 0.088_001 when convenient.

Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
3.7Low
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 34% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.088_001
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 29 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade MIK CryptX to 0.088_001.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
MIKCryptXAffected
  • <0.088_001
Fixed in
  • 0.088_001
GitHubCryptXpkg:github/CryptXOther threatsAffected
  • <0.088_001
Fixed in
  • 0.088_001

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Users should avoid using the streaming decrypt_done($tag) function for AEAD tag verification in CryptX versions before 0.088_001. Instead, use the one-shot *_decrypt_verify helpers which perform constant-time tag verification.

Description

CryptX versions before 0.088_001 for Perl compare AEAD authentication tags in non-constant time in the streaming decrypt_done path. The decrypt_done($tag) form compares it against the computed tag with memNE (memcmp() != 0), which short-circuits on the first differing byte, so its run time depends on the number of matching leading bytes. This affects all five AEAD modes: GCM, CCM, ChaCha20Poly1305, EAX and OCB. The one-shot *_decrypt_verify helpers are unaffected; they verify the tag inside libtomcrypt with a constant-time comparison. The timing difference is a tag-verification oracle. An attacker who can submit many candidate tags for the same nonce, ciphertext and associated data while measuring the timing precisely enough may recover the expected tag byte by byte and forge a message that verifies.

References

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