Skip to main content
VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-14570: TIMLEGGE Crypt::DSA · Weak Randomness

Affects TIMLEGGE Crypt::DSASource CVE Database V5

0
Compare

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 1.22 soon.

Data as of 17 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.5High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 44% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.22
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 5 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 17 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade Crypt::DSA and Crypt-DSA to 1.22.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
TIMLEGGECrypt::DSAAffected
  • <1.22
Fixed in
  • 1.22
GitHubCrypt-DSApkg:github/Crypt-DSAOther threatsAffected
  • <1.22
Fixed in
  • 1.22

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Users should consider all keys generated or used with Crypt::DSA versions prior to 1.22 as compromised and generate new keys using a fixed or updated version once available. Until then, avoid using affected versions for signing operations.

Description

Crypt::DSA versions before 1.22 for Perl draw the DSA signing nonce and private key from a biased random generator, leading to private-key recovery. "Crypt::DSA::Util::makerandom forces the high bit of every value it returns to obtain an exactly N-bit integer for prime search. The signing nonce and the private key are drawn from makerandom. Because the high bit is always set, the result is not uniform: its top bit is fixed, producing insecure values." An attacker who collects a modest number of signatures under an affected key, together with the public key, can recover the private key with a lattice attack. Keys used to sign with an affected version should be considered compromised and new keys should be generated.

References

Community reviews

Loading reviews…