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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-16515: zephyrproject zephyr · Dos

Affects zephyrproject zephyrSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.7 Medium : upgrade to 4.4.2 when convenient.

Data as of 1 Nov 2026, 22:58 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
4.7Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 15% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 4.4.2
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:L

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 18 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 1 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade zephyrproject zephyr to 4.4.2.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
zephyrprojectzephyrAffected
  • >=1.14.0 <4.4.2
Fixed in
  • 4.4.2
GitHubzephyrpkg:github/zephyrOther threatsAffected
  • >=1.14.0 <4.4.2
Fixed in
  • 4.4.2

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

The described fix adds suppression checks in net_icmpv6_send_error() to comply with RFC 4443. If you cannot patch yet, network administrators should consider network-level controls to limit spoofed IPv6 traffic or multicast abuse on local links.

Description

net_icmpv6_send_error() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv6.c implemented only one of the three RFC 4443 section 2.4 suppression rules (do not answer an ICMPv6 error with an ICMPv6 error). It did not check whether the triggering packet's source address identifies a single node (rule e.6) or whether the packet was sent to a multicast destination (rule e.3, whose only exceptions are Packet Too Big and Parameter Problem Code 2). Of the five call sites, only the port-unreachable path in subsys/net/ip/connection.c carried an equivalent guard of its own; the extension-header, unknown-next-header and fragmentation paths in subsys/net/ip/ipv6.c and subsys/net/ip/ipv6_fragment.c had none. An unauthenticated attacker with access to the same link can exploit this in two ways. Sending a single IPv6 packet to the link-local all-nodes group ff02::1 carrying an unrecognized next-header value, with the source address spoofed to a chosen victim, causes every Zephyr node on the link to emit an ICMPv6 Parameter Problem message to that victim — a reflector with an amplification factor equal to the number of nodes. Alternatively, sending a unicast packet whose source address is a multicast address causes the node to transmit its ICMPv6 error to that multicast address, turning one unicast packet into a link-flooded multicast frame. Packets addressed to ff02::1 are accepted unconditionally by ipv6_input(), and no check rejects a multicast source address, so no special configuration is required. The impact is degraded availability of the shared link and of the reflection victim, together with the ability for the attacker to hide its own address behind the responding nodes. The effect is amplified on constrained mesh links such as 802.15.4/Thread, where link-local multicast is flooded hop by hop. There is no memory-safety consequence: the error packet itself is well formed, it is simply emitted in cases where the protocol forbids it. The fix adds both suppression checks at the single choke point in net_icmpv6_send_error(), before any reply packet is allocated, preserving the RFC-mandated exceptions for NET_ICMPV6_PACKET_TOO_BIG and Parameter Problem Code 2. Note that the IPv4 counterpart net_icmpv4_send_error() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c still checks only for a broadcast destination and retains an equivalent gap for multicast destinations and non-unique sources.

References

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