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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-19566: RRWO Net::CIDR::Set · Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input

Affects RRWO Net::CIDR::SetSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 0.23 soon.

Data as of 9 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.5High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 50% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.23
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 12 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 10 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade Net::CIDR::Set and Net-CIDR-Set to 0.23.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
RRWONet::CIDR::SetAffected
  • <0.23
Fixed in
  • 0.23
GitHubNet-CIDR-Setpkg:github/Net-CIDR-SetOther threatsAffected
  • <0.23
Fixed in
  • 0.23

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, avoid passing untrusted or unchecked IPv6 prefix lengths to the contains() or add() methods in Net::CIDR::Set. Implement input validation to restrict prefix lengths to valid ranges (0 to 128) before processing.

Description

Net::CIDR::Set versions before 0.23 for Perl allow memory exhaustion and malformed set ranges via unbounded IPv6 prefix lengths. The _encode method accepts any prefix length matching `(0|[1-9][0-9]*)` and passes it to _width2bits(), which builds the mask as `'1' x ($width + 8)`, one character per bit. The _inc() method then unpacks the packed mask into a Perl array of one scalar per byte, so the prefix length alone sets the allocation size: `::/100000000` builds a 100 MB string and a 12.5 million element array. The value being tested is parsed, not just the configured ranges: contains() builds a set from its argument, and _guess_coder() tries the IPv4 coder and then the IPv6 coder, so an IPv4-only set expands an oversized IPv6 prefix length before the mixed address width check rejects it. Any caller that passes untrusted input to contains() or add() can exhaust process memory. A prefix length above 128 is also stored as a range that does not match the requested block: 2001:db8::/129 stringifies back unchanged, contains() of its own base address returns false, and removing it from a set drops the base address while the set still prints as covering it.

References

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