CVE-2026-27886: strapi · Path Traversal
Affects strapiSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · public detection template (Nuclei) · CVSS 9.2 Critical : upgrade to 5.37.0 as a priority.
Data as of 11 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (GitHub_M) | CVSS 4.0 | 9.2 |
|---|
- EPSS
- 1.9% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 80% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 5.37.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 14 May 2026
Detectable: evidence found.
nuclei template: Strapi <=5.36.x - Admin Credential Enumeration
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 11 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade strapi to 5.37.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| strapi strapi | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Description
Strapi is an open source headless content management system. Strapi versions starting in 4.0.0 and prior to 5.37.0 did not sufficiently sanitize query parameters when filtering content via relational fields. An unauthenticated attacker could use the `where` query parameter on any publicly-accessible content-type with an `updatedBy` (or other admin-relation) field to perform a boolean-oracle attack against private fields on the joined `admin_users` table, including the `resetPasswordToken` field. Extracting an admin reset token via this oracle made full administrative account takeover possible without authentication. When a filter such as `where[updatedBy][resetPasswordToken][$startsWith]=a` was applied to a public Content API endpoint, the underlying query generation performed a `LEFT JOIN` against the `admin_users` table and emitted a `WHERE` clause referencing the joined column. The query parameter sanitization layer did not block operator chains that traversed into relational target schemas the caller had no read permission on, allowing the response count to be used as a one-bit oracle on any admin-table field. The patch in version 5.37.0 introduces explicit query-parameter sanitization at the controller and service boundary via three new primitives: `strictParam`, `addQueryParams`, and `addBodyParams`. Operator chains that traverse into restricted relational targets are now rejected before reaching the database.