Skip to main content
VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-32632: nicolargo glances · Origin Validation Error

Affects nicolargo glancesSource CVE Database V5

0
Compare

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.9 Medium : upgrade to 4.5.2 when convenient.

Data as of 31 Oct 2026, 08:20 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.9Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 8% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 4.5.2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 18 Mar 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade glances and nicolargo/glances to 4.5.2.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
nicolargoglancesAffected
  • <4.5.2
Fixed in
  • 4.5.2
GitHubnicolargo/glancespkg:github/nicolargo/glancesOther threatsAffected
  • <4.5.2
Fixed in
  • 4.5.2

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

The primary mitigation is to upgrade Glances to version 4.5.2 or later, which includes patches for proper origin validation and TrustedHostMiddleware enforcement. Until upgrading, organizations should restrict access to Glances interfaces via network segmentation and firewall rules, limiting exposure to trusted internal networks only. Implement DNS rebinding protections at the network level, such as configuring DNS servers to reject suspicious rebinding patterns or using browser security features/extensions that detect rebinding attempts. Additionally, administrators should monitor logs for unusual Host header values or unexpected API access patterns. Educate users to avoid visiting untrusted or suspicious websites that could trigger DNS rebinding attacks. For environments requiring remote access, consider using VPNs or secure tunnels that do not rely on DNS resolution vulnerable to rebinding. Finally, review and harden web server configurations to enforce strict host header validation and origin checks.

Description

Glances is an open-source system cross-platform monitoring tool. Glances recently added DNS rebinding protection for the MCP endpoint, but prior to version 4.5.2, the main REST/WebUI FastAPI application still accepts arbitrary `Host` headers and does not apply `TrustedHostMiddleware` or an equivalent host allowlist. As a result, the REST API, WebUI, and token endpoint remain reachable through attacker-controlled domains in classic DNS rebinding scenarios. Once the victim browser has rebound the attacker domain to the Glances service, same-origin policy no longer protects the API because the browser considers the rebinding domain to be the origin. This is a distinct issue from the previously reported default CORS weakness. CORS is not required for exploitation here because DNS rebinding causes the victim browser to treat the malicious domain as same-origin with the rebinding target. Version 4.5.2 contains a patch for the issue.

References

Community reviews

Loading reviews…