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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-33184: nimiq core-rs-albatross · Integer Underflow

Affects nimiq core-rs-albatrossSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 1.3.0 soon.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.5High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 39% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.3.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 3 Apr 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade core-rs-albatross and github/nimiq/core-rs-albatross to 1.3.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
nimiqcore-rs-albatrossAffected
  • <1.3.0
Fixed in
  • 1.3.0
crates.iogithub/nimiq/core-rs-albatrosspkg:cargo/github/nimiq/core-rs-albatrossOther threatsAffected
  • <1.3.0
Fixed in
  • 1.3.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Upgrade to nimiq/core-rs-albatross version 1.3.0 or later, where this integer underflow issue has been patched. Since the vendor advisory confirms the fix in version 1.3.0, applying this official update fully mitigates the vulnerability.

Description

nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.3.0, the discovery handler accepts a peer-controlled limit during handshake and stores it unchanged. The immediate HandshakeAck path then honors limit = 0 and returns zero contacts, which makes the session look benign. Later, after the same session reaches Established, the periodic update path computes self.peer_list_limit.unwrap() as usize - 1. With limit = 0, that wraps to usize::MAX and then in rand 0.9.2, choose_multiple() immediately attempts Vec::with_capacity(amount), which deterministically panics with capacity overflow. This issue has been patched in version 1.3.0.

References

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