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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-33307: airtower-luna mod_gnutls · Stack-based Buffer Overflow

Affects airtower-luna mod_gnutlsSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 0.12.3 soon.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.5High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 28% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.12.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 24 Mar 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade mod_gnutls and airtower-luna/mod_gnutls to 0.12.3.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
airtower-lunamod_gnutlsAffected
  • <0.12.3
Fixed in
  • 0.12.3
GitHubairtower-luna/mod_gnutlspkg:github/airtower-luna/mod_gnutlsOther threatsAffected
  • <0.12.3
Fixed in
  • 0.12.3

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Organizations should upgrade mod_gnutls to version 0.12.3 or later immediately to address this vulnerability. Version 0.12.3 provides a minimal fix by adding certificate chain length checks, while version 0.13.0 fully redesigns the verification process to eliminate the fixed-size buffer. Since no workaround exists, patching is the only effective mitigation. Additionally, administrators should audit server configurations to identify if client certificate verification is enabled, as default configurations ignoring client certificates are not vulnerable. If immediate patching is not feasible, temporarily disabling client certificate verification can mitigate exposure but may reduce security. Monitoring server logs for segmentation faults or crashes related to mod_gnutls can help detect attempted exploitation. Implementing network-level protections such as rate limiting and intrusion detection systems tuned for anomalies in TLS handshakes may reduce attack likelihood. Finally, maintain up-to-date backups and incident response plans to recover quickly from potential denial of service events.

Description

Mod_gnutls is a TLS module for Apache HTTPD based on GnuTLS. In versions prior to 0.12.3 and 0.13.0, code for client certificate verification imported the certificate chain sent by the client into a fixed size `gnutls_x509_crt_t x509[]` array without checking the number of certificates is less than or equal to the array size. `gnutls_x509_crt_t` is a `typedef` for a pointer to an opaque GnuTLS structure created using with `gnutls_x509_crt_init()` before importing certificate data into it, so no attacker-controlled data was written into the stack buffer, but writing a pointer after the last array element generally triggered a segfault, and could theoretically cause stack corruption otherwise (not observed in practice). Server configurations that do not use client certificates (`GnuTLSClientVerify ignore`, the default) are not affected. The problem has been fixed in version 0.12.3 by checking the length of the provided certificate chain and rejecting it if it exceeds the buffer length, and in version 0.13.0 by rewriting certificate verification to use `gnutls_certificate_verify_peers()`, removing the need for the buffer entirely. There is no workaround. Version 0.12.3 provides the minimal fix for users of 0.12.x who do not wish to upgrade to 0.13.0 yet.

References

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