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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-44965: Datadog Android App · Improper Export of Android Application Components

Affects Datadog Android AppSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.5 Medium : upgrade to 5.9.2 when convenient.

Data as of 5 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.5Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 5% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 5.9.2
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 7 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 5 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade Datadog Android App to 5.9.2.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
DatadogAndroid AppAffected
  • >=5.9.2 <5.9.2
Fixed in
  • 5.9.2

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, users should avoid installing untrusted applications alongside the Datadog Android app and consider removing configured widgets if possible to reduce exposure.

Description

In versions of the Datadog Android application prior to v545-5.9.2, six App Widget configuration activities (IncidentWidgetActivity, MonitorSavedViewWidgetActivity, OnCallShiftsWidgetActivity, OnCallPagesWidgetActivity, SloWidgetActivity, DashboardWidgetActivity) are exported with no permission guard. Each accepts a caller-supplied AppWidgetManager.EXTRA_APPWIDGET_ID and, when no deep-link destination is resolved, uses it to load the matching widget's stored session and automatically log in as that user. Because Android widget IDs are small sequential integers, a co-installed application can brute-force this value to find one that matches a widget configured on the victim's device. This requires: A malicious application co-installed on the victim's device. At least one of the six widgets configured on the victim's home screen. An active Datadog session cached locally. Impact: The matching configuration activity opens in the foreground under the victim's session and renders live infrastructure data. Exposure is limited to a visual side channel (e.g., screen recording or accessibility services); the calling application cannot programmatically read the rendered data.

References

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