CVE-2026-47363: CWE-926 Improper Export of Android Application Components in Datadog Android App
The launcher activity AppActivity in the Datadog Android application is declared android:exported="true" with launchMode="singleTask" and no permission guard. On every onCreate and onNewIntent, it invokes Intent.getUserSession(), an extension that deserializes a full UserSession — user identity, OAuth access and refresh tokens, host, organization, datacenter, and permissions — from Bundle extras keyed under the com.datadog.app.* namespace. This extension lives in the main sourceset, not a test-only sourceset, despite a misleading comment referencing internal test fixtures. Any application installed on the device can invoke the launcher with arbitrary session extras. The startup pipeline accepts the injected session, persists it to user storage, optionally rotates persisted token storage when an OAUTH_OVERRIDE_TOKEN extra is set, and performs an automatic login under the attacker-chosen identity. The session preparer returns Ready without contacting the backend whenever the injected access token is not flagged as expired-or-expiring-soon, so no server-side token introspection takes place before auto-login. Preconditions: the Datadog application installed on the victim device, and a zero-permission co-installed malicious application. The attacker must possess any OAuth access token they are willing to have the victim use, including the attacker's own Datadog tokens.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The Datadog Android app (version 5.9.2) declares its launcher activity AppActivity as android:exported="true" with launchMode="singleTask" and no permission restrictions. On lifecycle events, it deserializes a UserSession object from Intent extras, which includes sensitive data such as user identity and OAuth tokens. Because any app on the device can invoke this activity with crafted extras, it can inject arbitrary session data. The app then persists this session and performs automatic login if the access token is not expired, without verifying the token with the backend. This allows a zero-permission malicious app to force the Datadog app to log in under an attacker-controlled identity, assuming the attacker possesses a valid OAuth token.
Potential Impact
An attacker with a zero-permission app on the same device can cause the Datadog Android app to automatically log in as an attacker-chosen user by injecting arbitrary session data, including OAuth tokens. This bypasses normal authentication flows and server-side token validation, potentially leading to unauthorized access to the victim's Datadog account within the app context. The attack requires the attacker to have a valid OAuth token but does not require additional permissions on the victim's device.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until an official fix is available, users should avoid installing untrusted applications on the same device as the Datadog Android app version 5.9.2. Vendors should restrict the exported status of the launcher activity or enforce permission checks and implement server-side token validation to prevent unauthorized session injection.
CVE-2026-47363: CWE-926 Improper Export of Android Application Components in Datadog Android App
Description
The launcher activity AppActivity in the Datadog Android application is declared android:exported="true" with launchMode="singleTask" and no permission guard. On every onCreate and onNewIntent, it invokes Intent.getUserSession(), an extension that deserializes a full UserSession — user identity, OAuth access and refresh tokens, host, organization, datacenter, and permissions — from Bundle extras keyed under the com.datadog.app.* namespace. This extension lives in the main sourceset, not a test-only sourceset, despite a misleading comment referencing internal test fixtures. Any application installed on the device can invoke the launcher with arbitrary session extras. The startup pipeline accepts the injected session, persists it to user storage, optionally rotates persisted token storage when an OAUTH_OVERRIDE_TOKEN extra is set, and performs an automatic login under the attacker-chosen identity. The session preparer returns Ready without contacting the backend whenever the injected access token is not flagged as expired-or-expiring-soon, so no server-side token introspection takes place before auto-login. Preconditions: the Datadog application installed on the victim device, and a zero-permission co-installed malicious application. The attacker must possess any OAuth access token they are willing to have the victim use, including the attacker's own Datadog tokens.
CVSS v3.1
Score 6.3medium
Affected software
Weaknesses
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The Datadog Android app (version 5.9.2) declares its launcher activity AppActivity as android:exported="true" with launchMode="singleTask" and no permission restrictions. On lifecycle events, it deserializes a UserSession object from Intent extras, which includes sensitive data such as user identity and OAuth tokens. Because any app on the device can invoke this activity with crafted extras, it can inject arbitrary session data. The app then persists this session and performs automatic login if the access token is not expired, without verifying the token with the backend. This allows a zero-permission malicious app to force the Datadog app to log in under an attacker-controlled identity, assuming the attacker possesses a valid OAuth token.
Potential Impact
An attacker with a zero-permission app on the same device can cause the Datadog Android app to automatically log in as an attacker-chosen user by injecting arbitrary session data, including OAuth tokens. This bypasses normal authentication flows and server-side token validation, potentially leading to unauthorized access to the victim's Datadog account within the app context. The attack requires the attacker to have a valid OAuth token but does not require additional permissions on the victim's device.
Mitigation Recommendations
Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until an official fix is available, users should avoid installing untrusted applications on the same device as the Datadog Android app version 5.9.2. Vendors should restrict the exported status of the launcher activity or enforce permission checks and implement server-side token validation to prevent unauthorized session injection.
Technical Details
- Data Version
- 5.2
- Assigner Short Name
- hackerone
- Date Reserved
- 2026-05-19T15:00:09.319Z
- Cvss Version
- null
- State
- PUBLISHED
- Remediation Level
- null
Threat ID: 6a762368bf8831d539ed442c
Added to database: 08/07/2026, 18:26:48 UTC
Last enriched: 08/07/2026, 18:46:08 UTC
Last updated: 08/08/2026, 00:01:48 UTC
Views: 8
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