CVE-2026-45843: Linux kernel · slip: bound decode() reads against the compressed packet length
Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High · fixed in d42bec6e4f6d6d658be365539400b3314b76b2a7 : patch Linux kernel soon.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:30 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 33% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- CISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
- Automatable
- Attackers can reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
- Technical impact
- Limited control over the software or limited information exposure
CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in d42bec6e4f6d6d658be365539400b3314b76b2a7, 335957df4ed60f02a2ec0432fbedbf0cc7241d8b, 37537e42e6df387398bee85cb85070cc80bb1e10 +5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 27 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: slip: bound decode() reads against the compressed packet length slhc_uncompress() parses a VJ-compressed TCP header by advancing a pointer through the packet via decode() and pull16(). Neither helper bounds-checks against isize, and decode() masks its return with & 0xffff so it can never return the -1 that callers test for -- those error paths are dead code. A short compressed frame whose change byte requests optional fields lets decode() read past the end of the packet. The over-read bytes are folded into the cached cstate and reflected into subsequent reconstructed packets. Make decode() and pull16() take the packet end pointer and return -1 when exhausted. Add a bounds check before the TCP-checksum read. The existing == -1 tests now do what they were always meant to.
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/6268f01ae989013671b526c883e92655342c6f6f (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/9aafba2f49e1fcccc2018816f5836a609c925879 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/335957df4ed60f02a2ec0432fbedbf0cc7241d8b (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/37537e42e6df387398bee85cb85070cc80bb1e10 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cefe32639933d652614b0bd50f818f9af4af78f (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/0511ecb00e61bf28e2fec4bb41fcce385c3a3b2d (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/d42bec6e4f6d6d658be365539400b3314b76b2a7 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c1367a2d7aad643a6f87c6931b13cc1a25e8ca7 (opens in a new tab)
- cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html (opens in a new tab)