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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-46242: Linux kernel · Use After Free

Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.8 High · fixed in ef4ca02e95363e78977ca04340d44fe3b4b2b81f : patch Linux kernel soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:18 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.8High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
4.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 91% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CISA SSVC
Exploitation
No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
Automatable
Attackers cannot reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
Technical impact
Total control over the software or total information disclosure

CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.

Patch
Available – fixed in ef4ca02e95363e78977ca04340d44fe3b4b2b81f, ced39b6a8062bac5c18a1c3df85634107eb8664a, a10fbbe74e1c743beb1bb312109366667461df8a +6
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 30 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • >=5.15.209 <5.15.222
  • >=6.1.175 <6.1.178
Fixed in
  • ef4ca02e95363e78977ca04340d44fe3b4b2b81f
  • ced39b6a8062bac5c18a1c3df85634107eb8664a
  • a10fbbe74e1c743beb1bb312109366667461df8a
  • a6dc643c69311677c574a0f17a3f4d66a5f3744b
  • 9324de74a3a59b9fde9b62ee45ebaa71458ba2e5
  • 6.1.178
  • 5.15.222
  • 3e1144d2515d28e4312e663ea05eac203101491d
  • 2de4db145b2992da496fea6c51f9839be678ae24
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • =6.4
Fixed in–

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file->f_ep under file->f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section (is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock). A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in that window observed the transient NULL, skipped eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op->release / file_free(). For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op->release is ep_eventpoll_release() -> ep_clear_and_put() -> ep_free(), which kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded ->refs hlist_head is exactly where epi->fllink.pprev points, so the subsequent hlist_del_rcu()'s "*pprev = next" scribbles into freed kmalloc-192 memory. In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() -- reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache. Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs. If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its __fput() is in flight. Because we bailed before clearing f_ep, that path takes the eventpoll_release() slow path into eventpoll_release_file() and blocks on ep->mtx until the waiter side's ep_clear_and_put() drops it. The bailed epi's share of ep->refcount stays intact, so the trailing ep_refcount_dec_and_test() in ep_clear_and_put() cannot free the eventpoll out from under eventpoll_release_file(); the orphaned epi is then cleaned up there. A successful pin also proves we are not racing eventpoll_release_file() on this epi, so drop the now-redundant re-check of epi->dying under f_lock. The cheap lockless READ_ONCE(epi->dying) fast-path bailout stays.

References

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