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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-46454: Apache Camel · Improper Input Validation

Affects Apache CamelSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical · fixed in 4.21.0 : patch Apache Camel as a priority.

Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.8Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.8% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 58% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 4.21.0, 4.18.3, 4.14.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 6 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: evidence found.

    Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade Apache to 4.21.0, 4.18.3 or 4.14.8.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Apache Software FoundationApache CamelAffected
  • >=4.19.0 <4.21.0
Fixed in
  • 4.21.0
Apache Software FoundationApache CamelAffected
  • >=4.15.0 <4.18.3
Fixed in
  • 4.18.3
Apache Software FoundationApache CamelAffected
  • >=4.0.0 <4.14.8
Fixed in
  • 4.14.8
MavenApache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-cometdpkg:maven/Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-cometdOther threatsAffected
  • >=4.0.0 <4.14.8
  • >=4.15.0 <4.18.3
  • >=4.19.0 <4.21.0
Fixed in
  • 4.14.8
  • 4.18.3
  • 4.21.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

A fix is available in Apache Camel versions 4.14.8, 4.18.3, and 4.21.0. Users are strongly recommended to upgrade to these versions to address the vulnerability. For those unable to upgrade immediately, it is advised to strip Camel control headers (e.g., removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*')) at the start of the route to prevent header injection. Additionally, installing an explicit Bayeux SecurityPolicy on the CometdComponent to require client authentication before publishing messages will mitigate unauthorized access.

Description

Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Camel Cometd Component. The camel-cometd component maps inbound Bayeux (CometD) message headers into the Camel Exchange without applying a HeaderFilterStrategy. CometdBinding.populateExchangeFromMessage copies the entire ext.CamelHeaders map supplied by the CometD client directly onto the Camel message (message.setHeaders), so any header name - including Camel-internal control headers such as CamelHttpUri, CamelFileName or CamelJmsDestinationName - is accepted unmodified. Because a CometdComponent installs no Bayeux SecurityPolicy by default, any client that can complete the Bayeux handshake against the CometD endpoint can publish such a message without authentication. An attacker can therefore inject arbitrary Camel control headers that influence the behaviour of downstream producers in the route (for example redirecting an HTTP producer, changing a file name, or overriding a JMS destination); the injected headers also persist across internal direct, seda and vm hops. The concrete downstream impact depends on which producers the route uses. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. The fix implements a HeaderFilterStrategy in the camel-cometd binding (a long-standing TODO in the code) that filters the Camel header namespace case-insensitively on inbound mapping, so client-supplied Camel* / camel* headers are no longer copied into the Exchange. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Camel control headers from inbound CometD messages before they reach any downstream producer (for example removeHeaders('Camel*') and removeHeaders('camel*') at the start of the route), and install an explicit Bayeux SecurityPolicy on the CometdComponent so that only authenticated clients can publish.

References

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