CVE-2026-46585: Apache Camel Lucene · Improper Input Validation
Affects Apache Camel LuceneSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High · fixed in 4.21.0 : patch Apache Camel Lucene soon.
Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 50% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 4.21.0, 4.18.3, 4.14.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 6 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: evidence found.
Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade Apache to 4.21.0, 4.18.3 or 4.14.8.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software FoundationApache Camel Lucene | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Apache Software FoundationApache Camel Lucene | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Apache Software FoundationApache Camel Lucene | Affected
| Fixed in
|
MavenApache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-lucenepkg:maven/Apache Software Foundation/org.apache.camel:camel-luceneOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
A fix is available in Apache Camel versions 4.14.8, 4.18.3, and 4.21.0. Users should upgrade to these versions to resolve the vulnerability. After upgrading, routes must use CamelLuceneQuery and CamelLuceneReturnLuceneDocs headers instead of QUERY and RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, it is recommended to strip the attacker-controllable QUERY and RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS headers before the Lucene producer and set the query from a trusted source within the route.
Description
Improper Input Validation, Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Lucene Component. The camel-lucene producer reads the search phrase from an Exchange header (LuceneConstants.HEADER_QUERY) whose value was the plain string QUERY (and RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS for HEADER_RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS). Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that exposes a Lucene query operation behind an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http), any HTTP client could therefore set the QUERY header and have its value executed against the full-text index, overriding the query the route intended to run. Depending on what is indexed, this allows reading documents the request should not have access to (for example a match-all query returns the entire index, or the route's intended per-user filter can be replaced), and expensive regular-expression queries can consume significant CPU. No credentials are required when the HTTP consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set the query via the raw header name must use CamelLuceneQuery (and CamelLuceneReturnLuceneDocs) instead of QUERY / RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the attacker-controllable headers before the Lucene producer and set the query from a trusted source (for example removeHeader('QUERY') and removeHeader('RETURN_LUCENE_DOCS'), then setHeader('QUERY', constant(...)) at the start of the route).