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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-47101: BerriAI litellm · Incorrect Authorization

Affects BerriAI litellmSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High : upgrade to 1.83.14 soon.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 11:52 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
8.7High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
1.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 67% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.83.14
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 21 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: evidence found.

    Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade berriai/litellm and litellm to 1.83.14.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
BerriAIlitellmAffected
  • <1.83.14
Fixed in–
GitHubberriai/litellmpkg:github/berriai/litellmOther threatsAffected
  • <1.83.14
Fixed in
  • 1.83.14
GitHublitellmpkg:github/litellmOther threatsAffected
  • <1.83.14
Fixed in
  • 1.83.14

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, restrict internal_user role permissions and monitor API key creation processes closely to detect anomalous key generation.

Description

LiteLLM prior to 1.83.14 allows an authenticated internal_user to create API keys with access to routes that their role does not permit. When generating a key, the allowed_routes field is stored without verifying that the specified routes fall within the user's own permissions. A key created with access to admin-only routes can then be used to reach those routes successfully, bypassing the role-based access controls that would otherwise block the request, enabling full privilege escalation from internal_user to proxy_admin.

References

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