Threats affecting pkg:github/litellm

LiteLLM in BerriAI has a weak authentication vulnerability that allows attackers with a valid JWT to impersonate any user by exploiting an email-based fallback lookup that does not verify the email_verified claim. This flaw enables attackers to inherit victim roles, including administrative privileges, and persistently overwrite identity bindings to maintain unauthorized access to sensitive endpoints.

BerriAI LiteLLM before 1.101.0-rc.1 contains a tenant isolation bypass vulnerability in the semantic cache layer that allows authenticated users to read other tenants' cached responses by exploiting a metadata key mismatch between _get_semantic_cache_tenant_scope() and _get_metadata_variable_name(). Attackers holding a valid virtual key can submit semantically similar prompts on affected routes such as /v1/responses and /bedrock/* to retrieve cached responses containing other tenants' personally identifiable information, financial data, or source code, and can cause agentic front-ends to auto-execute attacker-supplied tool calls under victim credentials by returning cached function_call or tool_calls payloads to a different principal.

LiteLLM prior to 1.83.10 allows a user to modify their own user_role via the /user/update endpoint. While the endpoint correctly restricts users to updating only their own account, it does not restrict which fields may be changed. A user who can reach this endpoint can set their role to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative access to LiteLLM including all users, teams, keys, models, and prompt history. Users with the org_admin role have legitimate access to this endpoint and can exploit this vulnerability without chaining any additional flaw.

LiteLLM prior to 1.83.14 allows an authenticated internal_user to create API keys with access to routes that their role does not permit. When generating a key, the allowed_routes field is stored without verifying that the specified routes fall within the user's own permissions. A key created with access to admin-only routes can then be used to reach those routes successfully, bypassing the role-based access controls that would otherwise block the request, enabling full privilege escalation from internal_user to proxy_admin.