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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-49454: szTheory relyra · Improper Authentication

Affects szTheory relyraSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical : upgrade to 1.2.0 as a priority.

Data as of 1 Nov 2026, 08:20 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.1Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 13% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.2.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 18 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 31 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade szTheory relyra to 1.2.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
szTheoryrelyraAffected
  • >=1.0.0 <1.2.0
Fixed in
  • 1.2.0
Hexrelyrapkg:hex/relyraOther threatsAffected
  • <1.2.0
Fixed in
  • 1.2.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Upgrade to relyra version 1.2.0 or later, where proper cryptographic verification of SAML signatures is implemented. Patch status is confirmed by the vendor advisory stating the issue is fixed in 1.2.0. No other mitigations are indicated.

Description

Relyra is a strict-by-default SAML 2.0 Service Provider library for Elixir and Phoenix. Versions 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 accept forged SAML signatures because SignatureValue was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result. The XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete as :public_key.verify over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized SignedInfo was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, DigestValue was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and canonicalize/2 remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes. A forged SignatureValue carrying an attacker-controlled NameID could be accepted as {:ok}. This issue has been fixed in version 1.2.0.

References

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