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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-53397: Linux kernel · nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure

Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5

0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High · fixed in bd69a825485168ef74e815ecb286754b570fdcc7 : patch Linux kernel soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 14:05 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.5High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 44% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CISA SSVC
Exploitation
No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
Automatable
Attackers can reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
Technical impact
Limited control over the software or limited information exposure

CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.

Patch
Available – fixed in bd69a825485168ef74e815ecb286754b570fdcc7, b94c4be77682aab06d65ca7296149e3bcfb37353, b2eb1ffd511d1b3c3e21122f97cbbccea411e277 +5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 19 Jul 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055, < bd69a825485168ef74e815ecb286754b570fdcc7
Fixed in
  • bd69a825485168ef74e815ecb286754b570fdcc7
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055, < b94c4be77682aab06d65ca7296149e3bcfb37353
Fixed in
  • b94c4be77682aab06d65ca7296149e3bcfb37353
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055, < b2eb1ffd511d1b3c3e21122f97cbbccea411e277
Fixed in
  • b2eb1ffd511d1b3c3e21122f97cbbccea411e277
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055, < a5b42c1e4ff2befaa6b96f7cbf32174751eba083
Fixed in
  • a5b42c1e4ff2befaa6b96f7cbf32174751eba083
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055, < 887f92ceccf3eacd5f2402db21254d66372fae00
Fixed in
  • 887f92ceccf3eacd5f2402db21254d66372fae00
LinuxLinuxAffected
  • ≥ a257cdd0e2179630d3201c32ba14d7fcb3c3a055, < 0853ac544c590880d797b04daa33fcb72b6be0e1
Fixed in
  • 0853ac544c590880d797b04daa33fcb72b6be0e1

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix posix_acl leak on SETACL decode failure nfsaclsvc_decode_setaclargs() and nfs3svc_decode_setaclargs() each call nfs_stream_decode_acl() twice, first for NFS_ACL and then for NFS_DFACL. Each successful call transfers ownership of a freshly allocated posix_acl into argp->acl_access or argp->acl_default. If the first call succeeds but the second fails, the decoder returns false and argp->acl_access is left dangling. ACLPROC2_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfssvc_release_attrstat and ACLPROC3_SETACL.pc_release was wired to nfs3svc_release_fhandle. Both only call fh_put() and have no knowledge of the ACL fields on argp. The posix_acl_release() pairs sat at the out: labels inside nfsacld_proc_setacl() and nfsd3_proc_setacl(), but svc_process() skips pc_func when pc_decode returns false, so that cleanup is unreachable on decode failure: svc_process_common() pc_decode() /* decode_setaclargs: false */ /* pc_func skipped */ pc_release() /* fh_put only -- ACLs leaked */ The orphaned posix_acl is leaked for the lifetime of the server. Fix by adding nfsaclsvc_release_setacl() and nfs3svc_release_setacl(), which release both argp->acl_access and argp->acl_default in addition to fh_put(), and wiring them as pc_release for their respective SETACL procedures. pc_release runs on every path svc_process() takes after decode, including decode failure, so the posix_acl_release() pairs are removed from the proc functions' out: labels to keep ownership in one place. This matches the existing release_getacl() pattern used by the sibling GETACL procedures.

References

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