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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-53942: conda infrastructure · Code Injection

Affects conda infrastructureSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.9 Critical.

Data as of 29 Oct 2026, 19:15 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.9Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (GitHub_M)CVSS 3.19.9
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 25% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 23 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
condainfrastructureAffected
  • =< 9c0f23857282ff5cf7a6b3ad6bf0dd6f9974be55
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

This vulnerability has been patched by the conda project in commit 9c0f238. Users and administrators should update their infrastructure code to include this fix. No further action is required if the patch is applied. If not yet patched, avoid triggering the affected workflow with untrusted input.

Description

Conda Organization Infrastructure is a centralized location for infrastructure codes. Prior to commit 9c0f238, a GitHub Actions Pwn Request vulnerability appears to remain present in conda/conda. The affected workflow is .github/workflows/update.yml. It is triggered by issue_comment events containing @conda-bot render or @conda-bot recreate. For the render path, the workflow obtains the pull request head repository and branch from the PR API, checks out that PR-controlled repository/ref using secrets.SYNC_TOKEN, and then runs conda/actions/template-files@7f6830b1428a9bd47f0b068892c77eae95207037. The external template-files action reads its default configuration and templates from the checked-out working directory. In the confirmed finding, that action uses an unsandboxed Jinja2 environment to render attacker-controlled template content. This creates a Pwn Request chain in which an untrusted PR/comment path can reach template rendering in a privileged token context. This issue has been patched via commit 9c0f238.

References

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