CVE-2026-54503: plone.app.textfield · Basic XSS
Affects plone.app.textfieldSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.3 Medium · fixed in 4.0.1 : update plone.app.textfield when convenient.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 34% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 4.0.1, 3.0.2, 2.0.2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 15 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade plone.app.textfield and plone/plone.app.textfield to 4.0.1, 3.0.2 or 2.0.2.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ploneplone.app.textfield | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| ploneplone.app.textfield | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| ploneplone.app.textfield | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubplone/plone.app.textfieldpkg:github/plone/plone.app.textfieldOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
This vulnerability is fixed in plone.app.textfield versions 2.0.2, 3.0.2, and 4.0.1. Users should upgrade to these or later versions to remediate the issue. No additional mitigation is indicated by the vendor advisory.
Description
plone.app.textfield provides a zope.schema-style field type called RichText for storing a value with a related MIME type. Prior to 2.0.2, 3.0.2, and 4.0.1, depending on the release line, RichTextValue.output returns an unsanitized stored RichText value when mimeType equals outputMimeType, including values that claim the text/x-html-safe output type. This equality shortcut bypasses the safe_html transform even though the transform itself correctly removes event-handler attributes and unsafe URI schemes. Equal types can result from a RichText field configured with the same mimeType and outputMimeType or from REST API input that supplies text/x-html-safe as its content type. The raw stored value is then emitted through tal:content=structure without escaping, allowing a user who can set a RichText field to store JavaScript that executes in a viewer's browser. This issue is fixed in versions 2.0.2, 3.0.2, and 4.0.1.
References
- github.com/plone/plone.app.textfield/security/advisories/GHSA-4r4f-gg25-rmg5 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/plone/plone.app.textfield/commit/0da1aeec2406cf640977eb857a03e792d2c7cac2 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/plone/plone.app.textfield/commit/467638e500d804c637031387a227a2b02d12a86f (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/plone/plone.app.textfield/commit/781d517a38524087fe57525a94806684908f852f (opens in a new tab)