CVE-2026-57080: SANKO Net::BitTorrent · Unthrottled Resource Allocation
Affects SANKO Net::BitTorrentSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High.
Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 42% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 30 Jun 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| SANKONet::BitTorrent | Affected
| Fixed in– |
GitHubNet-BitTorrentpkg:github/Net-BitTorrentOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, consider restricting or validating peer message lengths at the application or network level to prevent processing of anomalously large messages.
Description
Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.1.0 for Perl allow remote memory exhaustion via an uncapped peer-wire message-length prefix. The peer-wire framing in _process_messages trusts the 4-byte length prefix sent by a connected peer with no upper bound, while receive_data appends every inbound byte to the input buffer. A peer announces a length prefix of up to about 4 GiB and then streams bytes; the decoder waits until the buffer holds the full message before processing it, so the buffer grows without limit. Peer connections are unauthenticated, so any peer in the swarm exhausts the downloading process's memory. The largest legitimate message is a 16 KiB piece block, so any announced length far above that is anomalous.