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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-57081: SANKO Net::BitTorrent · Uncontrolled Recursion

Affects SANKO Net::BitTorrentSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High.

Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.5High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 42% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 30 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
SANKONet::BitTorrentAffected
  • <=2.1.0
Fixed in–
GitHubNet-BitTorrentpkg:github/Net-BitTorrentOther threatsAffected
  • <=2.1.0
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Until an official fix is available, users should avoid processing untrusted or suspicious bencoded data from peers, .torrent files, or network sources. Implementing input validation or limiting recursion depth in the bdecode function could mitigate the risk, but no official or temporary fixes are documented at this time.

Description

Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.1.0 for Perl allow remote memory exhaustion via deeply nested bencoded input. bdecode recurses once per nested list or dictionary level with no depth cap, and each recursive call receives the remaining buffer by value while the list and dictionary branches capture the whole remainder, so every live recursion frame keeps its own copy of the shrinking buffer (O(N^2) bytes for an N-deep input). The decoder runs on every untrusted bencode source: .torrent files, BEP09 metadata fetched from peers, DHT messages, and tracker responses. A bencoded input of roughly 150,000 nested lists (about 150 KB on the wire) drives multi-gigabyte peak memory, so one short message from any peer, or one crafted .torrent file or magnet link, terminates the client.

References

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