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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-58370: woodpecker · Authentication Bypass by Spoofing

Affects woodpeckerSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.1 High : upgrade to 3.15.0 soon.

Data as of 13 Nov 2026, 03:49 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
8.1High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (VulnCheck)CVSS 3.18.1
CNA (VulnCheck)CVSS 4.09.2
EPSS
0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 54% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 3.15.0
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 30 Jun 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade woodpecker to 3.15.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
woodpecker-ciwoodpeckerAffected
  • <3.15.0
Fixed in
  • 3.15.0
GitHubwoodpeckerpkg:github/woodpeckerOther threatsAffected
  • <3.15.0
Fixed in
  • 3.15.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, users should consider restricting merge request permissions from forks or disabling the affected GitLab forge driver integration to prevent exploitation.

Description

Woodpecker before 3.15.0 matches the ApprovalAllowedUsers bypass list against pipeline.Author. For the GitLab forge driver, pipeline.Author is populated from the git commit author name (commit.author.name) carried in the webhook payload, which is attacker-controlled and not verified by GitLab. A user who can open a merge request from a fork can set the commit author name to match an entry in ApprovalAllowedUsers, causing needsApproval to return false so the pipeline runs without the required approval. This defeats the fork-approval security boundary and allows execution of attacker-controlled pipeline steps on a Woodpecker agent and exfiltration of CI secrets exposed to the run. Other built-in forge drivers (Gitea, Forgejo, GitHub, Bitbucket) derive pipeline.Author from the forge-validated sender/actor identity and are not affected.

References

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