CVE-2026-62331: mtzanidakis praktor · Path Traversal
Affects mtzanidakis praktorSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High : upgrade to 0.9.1 soon.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 20:38 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (GitHub_M) | CVSS 3.1 | 8.2 |
|---|
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.9.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 30 Oct 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade praktor and mtzanidakis/praktor to 0.9.1.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| mtzanidakispraktor | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubmtzanidakis/praktorpkg:github/mtzanidakis/praktorOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Upgrade praktor to version 0.9.1 or later, where this path traversal vulnerability is fixed. The vendor advisory confirms the fix in 0.9.1. No additional mitigation is required if the upgrade is applied.
Description
praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1, both Telegram upload sites in `internal/telegram/bot.go` concatenate the attacker-controlled document filename into a destination path without sanitization, and `path.Join` collapses parent-directory traversal. A remote Telegram user who can message the bot can therefore write outside `uploads/` within the persistent agent workspace mounted at `/workspace/agent`. Because `allow_from: []` permits all senders by default, no prior authentication or privilege is required in that configuration. The attacker can plant or overwrite `CLAUDE.md`, instruction, skill, hook, or configuration files that the Claude agent reads and operates on across later runs, turning a document upload into stored instruction injection. The demonstrated arbitrary-write scope is the persistent agent workspace volume, not an unrestricted host-filesystem write. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.1.
References
- github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/security/advisories/GHSA-48v2-6jcm-fc99 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/pull/228 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/commit/c3731eeda01c0b3ec1dbd13cccd5a147c3182141 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/mtzanidakis/praktor/releases/tag/v0.9.1 (opens in a new tab)