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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-63334: jgraph drawio · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Affects jgraph drawioSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.8 Medium : upgrade to 30.2.7 when convenient.

Data as of 5 Nov 2026, 00:01 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
6.8Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 24% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 30.2.7
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 21 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 5 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade drawio and jgraph/drawio to 30.2.7.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
jgraphdrawioAffected
  • <30.2.7
Fixed in
  • 30.2.7
GitHubjgraph/drawiopkg:github/jgraph/drawioOther threatsAffected
  • <30.2.7
Fixed in
  • 30.2.7

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Upgrade draw.io to version 30.2.7 or later, where this SSRF vulnerability is fixed. The fix addresses the inconsistent DNS resolution and private address validation. No other mitigation is required if the upgrade is applied.

Description

draw.io is a configurable diagramming and whiteboarding application. Prior to version 30.2.7, deployments with ENABLE_DRAWIO_PROXY=1 are vulnerable to server-side request forgery because src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/Utils.java performs the private-address check in Utils.sanitizeUrl() using one DNS resolution, while src/main/java/com/mxgraph/online/ProxyServlet.java later calls URL.openConnection() and performs a second resolution. An attacker-controlled hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and then to a private, link-local, or cloud metadata address when the connection is opened. Successful exploitation can return cloud instance metadata or responses from internal HTTP services through the proxy. This issue is fixed in version 30.2.7.

References

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