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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-63341: moscajs aedes · Uncaught Exception

Affects moscajs aedesSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 1.1.1 soon.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 22:36 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
7.5High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (GitHub_M)CVSS 3.17.5
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.1.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 30 Oct 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade moscajs aedes to 1.1.1.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
moscajsaedesAffected
  • <1.1.1
Fixed in
  • 1.1.1

Description

Aedes is an MQTT broker that can run on any stream server. Prior to 1.1.1, the MQTT broker does not bound topic depth or structural complexity before passing topics through `mqemitter` into `qlobber`. A `PUBLISH`, `SUBSCRIBE`, or registered `Will` message containing an excessively deep topic can reach `qlobber._split_words` in `lib/qlobber.js` and trigger an uncaught `too many words` exception. Calls from `handlers/subscribe.js` and the publishing logic are not protected against that exception, so it escapes to the `Node.js event loop` and terminates the entire broker. The `Will` path is independently reachable when a client disconnects ungracefully: it calls `broker.publish` directly and bypasses the `PUBLISH` handler. An attacker must be able to establish an `MQTT session`, authenticated or unauthenticated according to broker configuration. A successful attack disconnects all legitimate clients and prevents reconnection until the broker process restarts. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.1.

References

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