The vulnerability arises from incorrect authorization in Docker Desktop's handling of socket mounts when the --use-api-socket flag is used. Enhanced Container Isolation (ECI) is designed to block Docker socket mounts from containers unless explicitly allowed via admin settings. However, the flag adds the socket mount via HostConfig.Mounts rather than HostConfig.Binds, and the ECI enforcement only inspects Binds. This oversight allows the mount to bypass ECI checks, granting the container full access to the Docker Engine socket and any stored authentication credentials of the host user. Exploitation requires local access with the ability to run Docker CLI commands.

Successful exploitation allows a local attacker to bypass Docker Desktop's Enhanced Container Isolation, gaining full access to the Docker Engine socket. This can lead to privilege escalation and unauthorized access to container registry credentials stored by the host user. The vulnerability poses a significant risk to container isolation and host security.

Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until an official fix is available, restrict local access to Docker CLI commands to trusted users only and monitor Docker Desktop updates from Docker for a patch addressing this issue.