CVE-2026-64523: Linux kernel · net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit
Affects Linux kernelSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.8 Critical · fixed in b913801ad9b9a51437d84d030ec6843e08976bd6 : patch Linux kernel as a priority.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 51% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- CISA SSVC
- Exploitation
- No evidence of active exploitation and no public proof of concept
- Automatable
- Attackers can reliably automate steps 1–4 of the kill chain
- Technical impact
- Total control over the software or total information disclosure
CISA SSVC assessment, 2026-10-16.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in b913801ad9b9a51437d84d030ec6843e08976bd6, 685b10dd0e32c7782cead16c8cf055c609678583, 22e371a93563c30ebebc576db049785e0d7fc617 +2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 25 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| LinuxLinux | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/handshake: Take a long-lived file reference at submit handshake_nl_accept_doit() needs the file pointer backing req->hr_sk->sk_socket to survive the window between handshake_req_next() and the subsequent FD_PREPARE() and get_file(). The submit-side sock_hold() does not provide that. sk_refcnt keeps struct sock alive, but struct socket is owned by sock->file: when the consumer fputs the last file reference, sock_release() tears the socket down regardless of any sock_hold. Add an hr_file pointer to struct handshake_req and acquire an explicit reference on sock->file during handshake_req_submit(). handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() release the reference on the completion-bit-winning path. The submit error path must also release the file reference, but after rhashtable insertion a concurrent handshake_req_cancel() can discover the request and race the error path. Gate the error-path cleanup -- sk_destruct restoration, fput, and request destruction -- with test_and_set_bit(HANDSHAKE_F_REQ_COMPLETED), the same serialization handshake_complete() and handshake_req_cancel() already use. When cancel has already claimed ownership, the submit error path returns without touching the request; socket teardown handles final destruction. The accept-side dereferences are not yet retargeted; that change comes in the next patch.
References
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/22e371a93563c30ebebc576db049785e0d7fc617 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/685b10dd0e32c7782cead16c8cf055c609678583 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/b913801ad9b9a51437d84d030ec6843e08976bd6 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/16eaba5aa89c04eea125905bb8f988c1897f4f29 (opens in a new tab)
- git.kernel.org/stable/c/09dba37eee70d0596e26645015f1aa95a9848e9d (opens in a new tab)