The AsyncSafeTransport SSRF guard in mealie-recipes mealie (mealie/pkgs/safehttp/transport.py) performs a single DNS resolution to validate the target IP against private IP ranges. However, the actual HTTP request uses the original hostname, which is re-resolved independently by the async transport. This disconnect allows a DNS rebinding attacker to return a public IP during validation and a private or cloud metadata IP during the real connection, bypassing the SSRF guard. The flaw is reachable by any authenticated user via the /api/recipes/create/url, /api/recipes/test-scrape-url, and /api/recipes/{slug}/image endpoints, enabling reading of internal HTTP services and cloud metadata through reflected scraper content.

An authenticated attacker can exploit this vulnerability to bypass SSRF protections and access internal network services or cloud metadata endpoints. This can lead to unauthorized disclosure of sensitive internal information. The vulnerability does not impact integrity or availability but has a high confidentiality impact as per the CVSS vector.

Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until a fix is available, restrict authenticated user access to the affected API endpoints and monitor for suspicious activity related to SSRF attempts. Consider implementing additional network-level protections to prevent unauthorized internal service access.