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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-7161: GeoVision GV-IP Device Utility · - Reliance on Security Through Obscurity

Affects GeoVision GV-IP Device UtilitySource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.3 Critical.

Data as of 31 Oct 2026, 08:20 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.3Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Contested

Critical score, yet low EPSS after six months
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 12% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 4 May 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
GeoVision Inc.GV-IP Device UtilityAffected
  • =9.0.5.0
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

Until a patch is released, restrict network access to trusted users only and avoid using the utility on untrusted or public networks to reduce exposure. Monitor for updates from GeoVision Inc. regarding remediation.

Description

An insufficient encryption vulnerability exists in the Device Authentication functionality of GeoVision GV-IP Device Utility 9.0.5. Listening to broadcast packets can lead to credentials leak. An attacker can listen to broadcast messages to trigger this vulnerability. When interacting with various Geovision devices on the network, the utility may send privileged commands; in order to do so, the username and password of the device need to be provided. In some instances the command is broadcasted over UDP and the username/password are encrypted using a cryptographic protocol that appears to be derivated from Blowfish. However the symmetric key used for the encryption is also included in the packet, and thus the security of the username/password only relies on the "obscurity" of the encryption scheme. An attacker on the same LAN can listen to the broadcast traffic once an admin user interacts with the device, and decrypt the credentials using their own implementation of the algorithm. With this password the attacker would have full control over the device configuration, allowing them to change its ip address or even reset it to factory default.

References

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