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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-72823: getgrav grav · Missing Authorization

Affects getgrav gravSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium : upgrade to 1.0.13 when convenient.

Data as of 12 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
5.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 26% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 1.0.13
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 14 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 13 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade grav and getgrav/grav-plugin-api to 1.0.13.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
getgravgravAffected
  • <1.0.13
Fixed in
  • 1.0.13
GitHubgetgrav/grav-plugin-apipkg:github/getgrav/grav-plugin-apiOther threatsAffected
  • <1.0.13
Fixed in
  • 1.0.13

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, restrict issuance of API keys to trusted super accounts only and consider disabling demo mode or limiting writable resources in the demo configuration to reduce risk.

Description

The Grav API plugin (getgrav/grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.13 contains an API-key scope cap bypass in DemoController. Its private requireSuper() method checks isSuperAdmin() and returns early before invoking requirePermission(), so the api_key_scopes cap (enforced only in requirePermission()) is skipped. As a result, any scoped API key minted on a super account can bypass its scope restrictions when calling the baseline() and reset() operations (e.g. POST /api/v1/demo/reset), allowing it to capture the demo baseline or force a demo reset. Impact is bounded to demo-engine control and is conditional on demo mode being configured with writable resources.

References

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