CVE-2026-72852: hank-ai darknet · Integer Overflow or Wraparound
Affects hank-ai darknetSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.5 High.
Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 11% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 20 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| hank-aidarknet | Affected
| Fixed in– |
GitHubdarknetpkg:github/darknetOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, avoid loading untrusted or crafted .cfg files into hank-ai darknet. Implement input validation or size checks on configuration parameters to prevent integer overflow conditions.
Description
hank-ai/darknet sizes a convolutional layer's weight and output heap buffers by multiplying configuration fields taken from a .cfg file in unchecked 32-bit int arithmetic. In src-lib/convolutional_layer.cpp, l.nweights is computed as (c / groups) * n * size * size and l.outputs as l.out_h * l.out_w * l.out_c, and both feed xcalloc directly. A .cfg whose true dimension product exceeds INT_MAX wraps to a small or zero value, so the allocation is undersized; for example width and height of 256 with filters of 65536 gives 2^32, which wraps to 0. forward_convolutional_layer then re-derives the GEMM dimensions with a different operand order, computing k as l.size*l.size*l.c / l.groups where the allocation divided before multiplying, and reads and writes through the undersized buffer. Loading the crafted .cfg for inference or training is sufficient and no valid .weights file is required. The reported proof of concept observed a heap buffer overflow read in gemm_nn_fast under AddressSanitizer and glibc allocator metadata corruption in a release build of the same input, indicating an out-of-bounds write.
References
- github.com/hank-ai/darknet/issues/148 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/hank-ai/darknet/blob/v6.0/src-lib/convolutional_layer.cpp (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/hank-ai/darknet/blob/v6.0/src-lib/convolutional_layer.cpp (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/hank-ai/darknet/blob/v6.0/src-lib/convolutional_layer.cpp (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/hank-ai/darknet (opens in a new tab)
- vulncheck.com/advisories/darknet-integer-overflow-in-convolutional-layer-buffer-sizing-leads-to-heap-buffer-overflow (opens in a new tab)