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0 CVE-2026-81334 is an out-of-bounds read and write vulnerability in hank-ai's darknet software. The issue arises because the software indexes its layer array using values from a configuration file without validating the index against the array's length. This leads to reading and writing beyond allocated memory when parsing crafted configuration files, causing reliable crashes and controlled writes of a fixed byte value. The vulnerability affects versions up to and including 6.0. No official patch or remediation guidance is currently available. Join the discussion | CVE Database V5 | 08/27/2026, 14:50:41 UTC Added: 08/27/2026, 16:54:10 UTC |
hank-ai/darknet sizes a convolutional layer's weight and output heap buffers by multiplying configuration fields taken from a .cfg file in unchecked 32-bit int arithmetic. In src-lib/convolutional_layer.cpp, l.nweights is computed as (c / groups) * n * size * size and l.outputs as l.out_h * l.out_w * l.out_c, and both feed xcalloc directly. A .cfg whose true dimension product exceeds INT_MAX wraps to a small or zero value, so the allocation is undersized; for example width and height of 256 with filters of 65536 gives 2^32, which wraps to 0. forward_convolutional_layer then re-derives the GEMM dimensions with a different operand order, computing k as l.size*l.size*l.c / l.groups where the allocation divided before multiplying, and reads and writes through the undersized buffer. Loading the crafted .cfg for inference or training is sufficient and no valid .weights file is required. The reported proof of concept observed a heap buffer overflow read in gemm_nn_fast under AddressSanitizer and glibc allocator metadata corruption in a release build of the same input, indicating an out-of-bounds write. Join the discussion | CVE Database V5 | 08/20/2026, 18:19:23 UTC Added: 08/20/2026, 18:37:43 UTC |
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