Dockge improperly limits pathname validation to write operations, specifically validating stack names only in the save() path with a regex allow-list. However, the path getter and Stack.getStack functions construct paths without validation, allowing traversal sequences in stack names to resolve outside the managed stacks directory. Authenticated users can exploit this to read .env and Compose files from arbitrary directories accessible by the server process, disclosing secrets. They can also invoke delete() to run 'docker compose down' and recursively remove directories if a valid Compose file is present. Instances configured with disableAuth automatically authenticate callers as admin, exposing these operations without authentication. Dockge often runs as root with Docker socket access, increasing potential impact.

An authenticated user can read sensitive environment and Compose files from any directory accessible to the dockge server process, potentially disclosing secrets. They can also delete directories containing valid Compose files, causing data loss. The vulnerability is more severe in instances with disabled authentication, which allow unauthenticated access to these operations. Since dockge commonly runs with root privileges and Docker socket access, the affected directories may include unrelated applications, increasing risk.

Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until a fix is available, restrict access to dockge instances, especially those with disableAuth enabled, to trusted users only. Avoid running dockge with root privileges or Docker socket access if possible. Monitor for updates from the vendor and apply official patches or mitigations once released.