CVE-2026-73040: louislam dockge · Path Traversal
Affects louislam dockgeSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High.
Data as of 18 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.9% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 61% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 20 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| louislamdockge | Affected
| Fixed in– |
GitHubdockgepkg:github/dockgeOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, avoid running dockge with the disableAuth option enabled to prevent unauthenticated access. Limit dockge's privileges and Docker socket access where possible to reduce impact. Monitor for updates from the vendor regarding an official fix.
Description
Dockge validates a stack name only on the write path. In backend/stack.ts the allow-list check in validate(), which requires the name to match ^[a-z0-9_-]+$, is reached from save() alone, while the path getter returns path.join(this.server.stacksDir, this.name) and Stack.getStack builds path.join(server.stacksDir, stackName) with no check. The socket handlers in backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts confirm the caller is logged in and that the name is a string, then pass it straight to Stack.getStack, so a name containing traversal sequences resolves outside the managed stacks directory. An authenticated user can therefore read the composeENV and composeYAML values of any directory the server process can reach, which discloses the secrets in that directory's .env or Compose file, and can invoke delete(), which runs docker compose down and then fsAsync.rm on the traversed path with recursive and force set, removing that directory. Disclosure is limited to files named .env or an accepted Compose filename, and deletion requires the target directory to hold a valid Compose file so that docker compose down exits successfully. Dockge commonly runs as root with access to the Docker socket, so the reachable set includes unrelated applications on the host. Instances configured with disableAuth, a supported option that logs the caller in as admin automatically, expose both operations without authentication.
References
- github.com/louislam/dockge/issues/994 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/stack.ts (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/louislam/dockge/blob/1.5.0/backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/louislam/dockge (opens in a new tab)
- vulncheck.com/advisories/dockge-path-traversal-via-unvalidated-stack-name-allows-arbitrary-compose-and-env-disclosure-and-arbitrary-directory-deletion (opens in a new tab)