CVE-2026-73136: ZenHive mpp · Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Affects ZenHive mppSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High : upgrade to 0.6.4 soon.
Data as of 16 Nov 2026, 20:25 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 49% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.6.4, 2207d7f456ae14c1d3fcacc6f635bf4f8cee1a34
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 19 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 16 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade mpp to 0.6.4; mpp to 2207d7f456ae14c1d3fcacc6f635bf4f8cee1a34.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| ZenHivempp | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| ZenHivempp | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Hexmpppkg:hex/mppOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
CPE configurations (1)
cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
If you cannot patch yet, avoid using static memo configurations in MPP.Methods.Tempo or implement additional verification to ensure binding between transfers and challenges.
Description
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer. MPP.Methods.Tempo normally binds a settled TIP-20 TransferWithMemo to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static "memo" is configured in method_config, check_matched_memo_binding/3 returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only token, recipient, amount and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a type="hash" credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer. This issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4.