CVE-2026-77581: alam00000 bentopdf · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Affects alam00000 bentopdfSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.6 High : upgrade to 2.8.7 soon.
Data as of 7 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 18% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 2.8.7
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 24 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 8 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade bentopdf and alam00000/bentopdf to 2.8.7.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| alam00000bentopdf | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubalam00000/bentopdfpkg:github/alam00000/bentopdfOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
A fix is available in BentoPDF version 2.8.7. Users should upgrade to this version to remediate the vulnerability. Since this is a cloud service with a Worker execution environment, the vendor manages remediation for the official deployment. For self-hosted instances, administrators must apply the update to ensure protection. Deployments should also ensure PROXY_SECRET is configured to enable signature checks as an anti-abuse measure.
Description
BentoPDF is a client-side PDF toolkit that is self hostable. In 2.8.6 and earlier, the certificate and timestamp CORS proxy in cloudflare/cors-proxy-worker.js uses isPrivateOrReservedHost() to validate a supplied hostname separately from the DNS resolution used by fetch(targetUrl), allowing an attacker-controlled hostname to resolve to an internal or reserved destination after validation. A certificate-like path can satisfy ALLOWED_PATH_PATTERNS, and direct clients can forge the browser-oriented Origin header. Deployments without PROXY_SECRET skip the optional signature check, while the signature is an anti-abuse measure rather than a destination-security boundary. The proxy has a 10 MB response limit and can relay response bodies from reachable destinations. The advisory identifies both the official Worker deployment and self-hosted instances as impacted where the Worker execution environment can reach internal or reserved destinations. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.7.
References
- github.com/alam00000/bentopdf/security/advisories/GHSA-5xjf-rr5x-pcfj (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/alam00000/bentopdf/commit/45496fcd2ed6e02dcdde0d3839cc5024c091760c (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/alam00000/bentopdf/commit/58cd1a8893bfe06e4a59a72adc2e7db00a8b9266 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/alam00000/bentopdf/releases/tag/v2.8.7 (opens in a new tab)