CVE-2026-7820: pgAdmin 4 · CWE-307
Affects pgAdmin 4Source CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.5 Medium : upgrade to 9.15 when convenient.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 06:59 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 11% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 9.15
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 11 May 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade pgadmin-org/pgadmin4 and pgAdmin 4 to 9.15.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| pgadmin.orgpgAdmin 4 | Affected
| Fixed in– |
GitHubpgadmin-org/pgadmin4pkg:github/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4Other threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubpgAdmin 4pkg:github/pgAdmin 4Other threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
If you cannot patch yet, administrators should consider restricting access to the /login endpoint or implementing additional external rate limiting controls to mitigate brute-force attacks on INTERNAL accounts. Monitoring for unusual authentication activity targeting INTERNAL users may also help detect exploitation attempts.
Description
Improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts (CWE-307) in pgAdmin 4.pgAdmin enforces MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS only inside its custom /authenticate/login view. Flask-Security's default /login view, which is registered automatically by security.init_app() and is reachable on every server, never consulted the User.locked field: pgAdmin's User model relied on Flask-Security's UserMixin.is_locked() (which always returns 'not locked') and Flask-Login's is_active (which only checks the active column, not locked). An attacker who triggered an account lockout via /authenticate/login could therefore obtain a session by re-submitting valid credentials directly to /login, defeating the brute-force-protection control for accounts using the INTERNAL authentication source. The same bypass also means that login attempts via /login are never rate-limited, so an attacker can perform an unbounded online password-guessing attack against INTERNAL accounts regardless of MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS. Fix overrides User.is_active and User.is_locked() so the locked column is enforced on every authentication path. LDAP, OAuth2, Kerberos, and Webserver users are not reachable by this bypass because they have no local password and are rejected by Flask-Security's LoginForm.validate before the locked check; the lockout itself is also internal-only (the /authenticate/login view filters by auth_source=INTERNAL). This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.15.