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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-82759: team-alembic ash_authentication · Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt

Affects team-alembic ash_authenticationSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 1.8 Low : upgrade to 5.0.0-rc.14 or 4.15.0 when convenient.

Data as of 1 Nov 2026, 11:03 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
1.8Low
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.1% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 3% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 5.0.0-rc.14, 4.15.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 17 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 1 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade team-alembic ash_authentication to 5.0.0-rc.14 or 4.15.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
team-alembicash_authenticationAffected
  • >=5.0.0-rc.0 <5.0.0-rc.14
Fixed in
  • 5.0.0-rc.14
team-alembicash_authenticationAffected
  • >=4.12.0 <4.15.0
Fixed in
  • 4.15.0
team-alembicash_authenticationAffected
  • ≥ 255cfc9c0e511b7e0de39f8b3d676ae994fae06c, < d8a9c4b6bde828fdc8346198d5e4f588b5937541
Fixed in–
Hexash_authenticationpkg:hex/ash_authenticationOther threatsAffected
  • >=4.12.0 <4.15.0
  • >=5.0.0-rc.0 <5.0.0-rc.14
Fixed in
  • 4.15.0
  • 5.0.0-rc.14

CPE configurations (1)

  • cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

No explicit patch or remediation is provided in the input data. Users should avoid using the default salt and configure a strong, secret salt value to increase the cost of precomputation attacks. Consider disabling the :hash privacy mode or using a more secure pseudonymization method until an official fix is available.

Description

Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on's :hash privacy mode is meant to pseudonymise. AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1 computes a single unkeyed :crypto.hash(:sha256, salt <> ip) and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the :audit_log_ip_salt or :secret application config keys, and falls back to the constant "default-salt-change-in-production" published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

References

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