CVE-2026-85500: team-alembic ash_authentication · Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness
Affects team-alembic ash_authenticationSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical : upgrade to 5.0.0-rc.14 or 4.15.0 as a priority.
Data as of 1 Nov 2026, 11:03 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 55% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 5.0.0-rc.14, 4.15.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 17 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 1 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade team-alembic ash_authentication to 5.0.0-rc.14 or 4.15.0.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| team-alembicash_authentication | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| team-alembicash_authentication | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| team-alembicash_authentication | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Hexash_authenticationpkg:hex/ash_authenticationOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
CPE configurations (1)
cpe:2.3:a:team-alembic:ash_authentication:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
If you cannot patch yet, avoid using affected versions or implement additional access controls to compensate for the bypass.
Description
Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows an unconfirmed user to obtain a session, defeating a mandatory email confirmation requirement. AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions.check_user/2 decides whether the attribute named by require_confirmed_with is set using a bare is_nil(Map.get(user, value)). When that attribute is not selected on the loaded record Map.get/2 returns %Ash.NotLoaded{}, and when a field policy denies it for the current actor it returns %Ash.ForbiddenField{}. Neither is nil, so the rejection branch is skipped and sign-i require_confirmed_with is enforced in two places, and neither holds in every configuration. sign_in_with_token and register are checked only inside AshAuthentication.Strategy.Password.Actions, not on the action itself, so any caller that invokes the action directly skips the check. An API layer such as AshGraphql or AshJsonApi invokes the action directly, so this applies to the default configuration. Where a check does run it compares the confirmation attribute against nil. That attribute holds %Ash.NotLoaded{} or %Ash.ForbiddenField{} when it sets select_by_default?: false, when an API layer narrows the read's select, or when a field policy hides it from the sign-in actor. Neither struct is nil, so those configurations read every user as confirmed. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.3.8 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.
References
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-fc47-6pgw-wh22 (opens in a new tab)
- cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-85500.html (opens in a new tab)
- osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-85500 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/7d37bc6e4df6697b5813d2f373f0fdb08f813f98 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/17f4c25a372d1778c9cc457759e6357570d83711 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/1076639a9d40213088d110c79ba6735b8cc85b16 (opens in a new tab)