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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-88823: OpenSSL · Missing Cryptographic Step

Affects OpenSSLSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · fixed in 4.1.1 : update OpenSSL when convenient.

Data as of 10 Nov 2026, 18:50 UTC

Severity
Unrated

Rated by Threat Radar · CVSS not yet scored by NVD

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
Patch
Available – fixed in 4.1.1, 4.0.4, 3.5.10

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 10 Nov 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 10 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade OpenSSL to 4.1.1, 4.0.4 or 3.5.10.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
OpenSSLOpenSSLAffected
  • >=4.1.0 <4.1.1
Fixed in
  • 4.1.1
OpenSSLOpenSSLAffected
  • >=4.0.0 <4.0.4
Fixed in
  • 4.0.4
OpenSSLOpenSSLAffected
  • >=3.5.0 <3.5.10
Fixed in
  • 3.5.10

Description

Issue summary: The AES-GCM-SIV implementation treats a zero-length Additional Authenticated Data (AAD) update as a reset of all the AAD supplied so far, instead of leaving the AAD unchanged. An application that supplies its AAD in several fragments, one of which is empty, therefore produces or verifies messages whose authentication tag does not cover the AAD supplied before the empty fragment. Impact summary: Data an application intended to authenticate alongside a message is silently left unauthenticated. An attacker can forge the AAD of such a message. CWE: CWE-325: Missing Cryptographic Step Description: An application passing AAD in multiple chunks of which some have zero length will have the previous AAD chunks effectively unauthenticated. Also, on context re-initialisation, the AAD was not reset, which meant that any AAD accumulated from the previous context usage were also included in the AAD of the new message. The fix makes a zero-length AAD update a no-op and clears any accumulated AAD whenever the context is re-initialised with a key or a nonce. A re-initialisation that only changes parameters keeps the AAD. FIPS impact: no The FIPS modules are not affected, as AES-GCM-SIV is not a FIPS approved algorithm and is implemented only in the default provider, outside the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.

References

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