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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-91129: home-assistant core · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Affects home-assistant coreSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.4 Medium : upgrade to 2026.2.3 when convenient.

Data as of 5 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
5.4Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 22% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 2026.2.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 22 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 6 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade core and home-assistant/core to 2026.2.3.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
home-assistantcoreAffected
  • <2026.2.3
Fixed in
  • 2026.2.3
GitHubhome-assistant/corepkg:github/home-assistant/coreOther threatsAffected
  • <2026.2.3
Fixed in
  • 2026.2.3

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

This vulnerability is fixed in Home Assistant core version 2026.2.3. Users should upgrade to version 2026.2.3 or later to remediate this issue. No additional mitigation steps are indicated or required beyond applying the official fix.

Description

Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.2.3, the IPP integration automatically processed unauthenticated _ipp._tcp.local mDNS announcements in homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py, where async_step_zeroconf passed attacker-controlled host, port, and base_path values to validate_input for printer metadata retrieval. Because the shared HTTP client followed attacker-controlled cross-origin redirects without blocking loopback targets, a local-network attacker could redirect the request to 127.0.0.1 or another internal service without user interaction or prior IPP configuration. This issue is fixed in version 2026.2.3.

References

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