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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-91972: vikunja · Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts

Affects vikunjaSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High : upgrade to 2.6.0 soon.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 20:25 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
8.7High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 50% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 2.6.0
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 15 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 30 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade vikunja and github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja to 2.6.0.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
go-vikunjavikunjaAffected
  • <2.6.0
Fixed in
  • 2.6.0
Gogithub.com/go-vikunja/vikunjapkg:golang/github.com/go-vikunja/vikunjaOther threatsAffected
  • <2.6.0
Fixed in
  • 2.6.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

The vendor's recommended fix is to apply the unconditional pre-auth rate-limit floor ('unauthRateLimit()') to the v2 public route group, aligning it with v1 behavior. If you cannot patch yet, users should consider implementing custom rate-limiting controls on v2 pre-auth endpoints to mitigate abuse.

Description

### Summary `registerAPIRoutesV2` never applies the unconditional pre-auth rate-limit floor (`unauthRateLimit()`) to the v2 public routes — it passes that limiter only to `/api/v2/ws` — and otherwise relies on `setupRateLimit`, which registers nothing when `ratelimit.enabled` is false (the default). So on a stock install every v2 pre-auth endpoint (login, register, password-reset token, oauth token) is unthrottled, while its v1 twin is throttled. ### Details `unauthRateLimit()` -> `perMinuteIPRateLimit("noauth", RateLimitNoAuthRoutesLimit)` (`pkg/routes/rate_limit.go`, ~lines 100-118) is an unconditional per-IP floor (default 10/60s) that deliberately ignores `RateLimitEnabled`, which is why v1's pre-auth routes are throttled even with the global limiter off. v1 applies it: `ur := a.Group(""); ur.Use(unauthRateLimit())` (`pkg/routes/routes.go` ~line 459). `registerAPIRoutesV2` (~lines 405-431) passes the `unauthRateLimit()` instance only to `/api/v2/ws`; its auth routes get only `setupRateLimit(a, ...)`, which is config-gated and registers nothing by default. ### PoC (verified at runtime against v2.5.0) ``` POST /api/v1/login x25 -> 429 from attempt 5 POST /api/v2/login x25 -> 403 x25, 429 x0 POST /api/v1/user/password/token -> 429 (throttled) POST /api/v2/user/password/token x20 -> 404 x20, 429 x0 ``` Request bodies are byte-identical across versions (shared `user.Login` / `user.PasswordTokenRequest`). Both v2 endpoints reach their handlers (403/404, not route-404), so the comparison is valid. ### Impact The pre-auth rate-limit floor — the instance's only default anti-brute-force / anti-abuse control — is absent on all v2 public endpoints. Enables unbounded credential guessing, account-enumeration probing, and password-reset flooding on a default install. Reported as an authentication-control bypass, not a DoS. ### Fix Apply `unauthRateLimit()` to the v2 public route group, matching v1.

References

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