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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-93399: Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System (WordPress plugin) · Insecure Direct Object Reference

Affects Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System (WordPress plugin)Source CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 9.1 Critical.

Data as of 8 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
9.1Critical
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.5% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 47% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 25 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: evidence found.

    Public exploit code: GitHub proofs of concept

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), GitHub proofs of concept, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 9 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
ladelaOnline Scheduling and Appointment Booking System – BooklyAffected
  • <=28.2
Fixed in–

AI-suggested

Until an official fix is available, restrict access to the affected AJAX endpoints if possible and monitor for suspicious activity related to order enumeration or booking deletions. Avoid exposing sequential order IDs publicly and consider implementing additional authorization checks on these AJAX actions.

Description

The Bookly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in versions up to, and including, 28.2 via the 'bookly_get_form_id', 'bookly_render_complete', 'bookly_add_to_calendar' and 'bookly_rollback_order' AJAX actions. This is due to the 'bookly_get_form_id' handler blindly storing the attacker-controlled 'order_id' from the submitted form_data into a new booking session, which the 'bookly_render_complete' handler then trusts to look up and return the corresponding Order's secret token without verifying that the current session created that order. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to enumerate sequential order IDs, disclose other customers' order tokens, retrieve calendar/appointment information via 'bookly_add_to_calendar' and permanently delete arbitrary non-completed bookings via 'bookly_rollback_order', which cascade-deletes the customer_appointment and (when no other customers are attached) the underlying appointment.

References

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