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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-93594: ArcadeData arcadedb · Incorrect Authorization

Affects ArcadeData arcadedbSource CVE Database V5

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.1 High : upgrade to 26.9.1 soon.

Data as of 1 Nov 2026, 22:58 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
7.1High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 38% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 26.9.1
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 18 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 1 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade arcadedb and arcadedata/arcadedb to 26.9.1.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
ArcadeDataarcadedbAffected
  • <26.9.1
Fixed in
  • 26.9.1
GitHubarcadedata/arcadedbpkg:github/arcadedata/arcadedbOther threatsAffected
  • <26.9.1
Fixed in
  • 26.9.1

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Upgrade to ArcadeDB version 26.9.1 or later, where this authorization bypass vulnerability is fixed. No other mitigations are indicated by the vendor advisory. Patch status is confirmed fixed in 26.9.1.

Description

ArcadeDB (Maven artifact com.arcadedb:arcadedb-engine) through 26.8.1 enforces its per-type/per-record access-control rules only in LocalBucket, keyed on file id. Query-execution paths that reach record data through LSM index files or the TimeSeries engine never invoke that permission check, so an authenticated user who is denied readRecord/deleteRecord on a type can still, with a single ordinary SQL statement, read the type's indexed key values and record IDs (e.g. SELECT key, rid FROM INDEX:Type[field]), read MAX/MIN values via the index shortcut, read and count TimeSeries samples, learn the type's record count, and delete index entries (DELETE FROM INDEX:Type[field]), which desynchronizes the index from the data and can defeat unique constraints. Index and type names needed for exploitation are discoverable because SELECT FROM schema:indexes is unfiltered. The issue affects both embedded and server deployments and all transports (HTTP, Bolt, Postgres, Gremlin) once a principal is bound. Fixed in 26.9.1.

References

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