CVE-2026-96454: tw93 Pake · Missing Authorization
Affects tw93 PakeSource CVE Database V5
Mentioned vulnerabilities
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High.
Data as of 6 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 41% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 23 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 6 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| tw93Pake | Affected
| Fixed in– |
npmpake-clipkg:npm/pake-cliOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
Until a fix is available, users should avoid running untrusted web content inside Pake applications or restrict the use of third-party scripts. Application developers should review and tighten IPC access controls and ensure app commands are properly checked against access control lists.
Description
Pake turns a website into a desktop application built on Tauri. Every application it generates inherits two settings from the upstream template, and together they hand native functionality to untrusted web content. The first is in src-tauri/capabilities/default.json, which grants IPC access with "remote": { "urls": ["https://*.*"] }. That wildcard tells Tauri to accept IPC from any HTTPS origin, not just the site the application was built to wrap. The second is "withGlobalTauri": true in src-tauri/tauri.conf.json, which puts window.__TAURI__.core.invoke() in reach of ordinary page JavaScript. Tauri's access control list only checks plugin commands, the ones prefixed with plugin:. Commands the application registers itself through generate_handler!, known as app commands, are never checked against the ACL. So once an origin holds IPC access, it can call every app command with nothing else standing in the way. Pake registers download_file as an app command, and it does not appear in the permissions list because it does not need to. The practical effect is that any script running on any HTTPS page inside a Pake application can invoke the application's native commands. That includes third-party script the wrapped site loads on its own, such as analytics, advertising, or a compromised CDN. Anyone distributing their own Pake application gets the same access without asking for it. Chained with the path traversal in download_file that is tracked separately as CVE-2026-82635, this reaches arbitrary file write and persistent code execution.
References
- github.com/tw93/Pake (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/tw93/Pake/blob/main/src-tauri/capabilities/default.json (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/tw93/Pake/blob/main/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json (opens in a new tab)
- v2.tauri.app/security/capabilities/ (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/tw93/Pake/releases/tag/V3.17.0 (opens in a new tab)